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ABSTRACT
Kodzi offers a timely perspective on the ongoing debate about how China’s BRI might deliver tangible
benefits to African partners. The impact of Chinese engagement on local businesses in different regions is
explored both broadly, and in a specific African country context. Using the resource dependence theory
and the supply chain practice view, the chapter focuses on technology- and knowledge-enhancing
industry linkages to conceptualize a pragmatic response by African industry sectors to the competitive
pressures associated with Chinese business engagement. By adopting a response view, this chapter
proposes credible options for African countries to increase the strategic value of their contribution in BRI
exchanges - rather than being casualties of power asymmetry.
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1. Introduction
China’s increasing role in African development is consistent with the goals of the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). The 2015 Ministerial Meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
ended with a declaration that China-Africa relations have been upgraded to “comprehensive strategic and
cooperative partnership status”. This is significant because China categorizes its relations with other
nations in order of importance (strategic partner, cooperative partner, and friendly cooperative), based on
depth of collaboration and other factors. The FOCAC declaration is an implicit acknowledgement of
interdependence between the parties, and a signal of increasing Chinese investment in African countries
for the foreseeable future. The proliferation of Chinese firms in Africa also appears to be driven by
shorter institutional distance between China and Africa, leading to more favorable risk assessments and
easier adjustment of business practices to local conditions (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008; Luo et al.
2011; Wang et al. 2013). However, increasing the level of engagement is also associated with unintended
effects like competitive pressures, power asymmetries and diplomacy challenges. For host nation
businesses, the combination of competitive pressures and the imbalance of power in China’s favor raises
the stakes for survival. Thus, with increasing Chinese engagement, it is important for local businesses in
African countries to understand the real basis for competitive advantage in their local markets, in order to
be adequately rewarded in the ensuing exchange. From a supply chain disruption perspective, it is
conceivable that even for a country in a weaker position, the survival of its industries may be highly
beneficial to global economic exchanges.
China has itself prioritized the survival of various industries by providing support for businesses
in both their domestic growth and international expansion. The Haier Group is one such business, that has
played a significant role in transforming a fledgling home appliances industry, while benefitting from
state support of the industry (Duysters et el. 2009). The Haier Group appears to have subsequently staged
a robust response to the competition thrust upon it by the entrance of GE and Whirlpool into the Chinese
market – and has more than survived. Du (2003), Child and Rodrigues (2005), and Duysters et al. (2009)
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have all examined Haier’s competitive response in detail. Other examples of industry sector response to
competitive foreign direct investment (FDI) include Bajaj Auto in India. Bajaj focused on the competitive
levers within its supply chain – distinctive local products, local connections, and local distribution
networks – to continue earning substantial market rents when Honda entered the Indian motorcycle
market (Dawar and Frost 1999). The response principles adopted by the Haier Group and Bajaj Auto may
have application for local African industry sectors, given that the operating context at the time bears some
similarities with the current African situation in terms of FDI flows and limited in-country capabilities.
The nature of the response will depend on the intensity of the power dynamics and competitive pressures
resulting from Chinese exchanges with various African countries. For example, Djibouti may have only
been a “pitstop” on China’s path to European markets, since the country previously had just “friendly
negotiations” with China. However, Djibouti’s increasing importance in providing global access for
Chinese-driven Ethiopian exports, and in enhancing security to ship lanes in the Horn of Africa has
changed the relationship significantly. Djibouti welcomed the opening of a Chinese-funded Silkroad
International Bank in January 2017, and China’s first foreign military base in July 2017. It appears that
this country will have a key role in the unfolding of the BRI. More intense engagement with a strategic
partner may warrant a comprehensive response, to ensure mutually beneficial exchanges. So, it is of
interest for Djibouti to carve out local industry advantages in transportation and logistics, for example, as
it provides benefits to the BRI. The broad question in this study is how countries that are integral to the
BRI might recognize and harness the potential value they bring to these economic exchanges. Thus, we
concur with previous literature recommending a search for strategies by which Africa might utilize the
developmental spin-offs that result from the increased investment and trade (Cheru and Obi 2011). Given
the importance of African countries to the BRI based on the FOCAC declaration, this study examines
applicable response strategies for African countries with increased FDI flows from China. The study
explores dimensions of industry-level response and the enabling mechanisms for the survival of specific
sectors that experience disruption through Chinese investment. By adopting a pragmatic conceptualization
of how African countries could respond to China’s business engagement, this study contributes a critical
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dimension to the ongoing debate about how China’s BRI might deliver tangible benefits to African
countries. This response view will allow managers of impacted business clusters to proactively embrace
options for meaningful exchange under competition, rather than be victims.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we review China’s engagement
in Latin American and Southeast Asian countries, to identify patterns of impact on local industry. Our
goal is to ascertain which patterns might signal possible business impacts on African countries in the new
BRI dispensation. We adopt the resource dependency theory and the supply chain practice view as our
framework for exploring impact and response. We then select Kenya for in-depth analysis, given its
economic influence in the East African region, the importance of its Mombasa port as a gateway for trade,
and evidence of multi-sectoral Chinese investment. This step involves examining flows of product,
information and capital into, and out of Kenya to understand the mutual dependencies and power
imbalance associated with the China-Kenya exchange. The next stage conceptualizes how specific
industries and government sectors might respond to the competitive pressures accompanying Chinese
business engagement. We summarize the discussion with possible theoretical generalizations of this
response view to other African countries connected with the BRI.

2. Expected impact of Chinese Engagement
Many developing countries seek FDI, along with the expectation of positive spillovers like job
creation, technology transfer, and productivity increases. Such positive effects are likely to be more
substantial if the investors are closer technologically and institutionally (Takii 2005; Luo et al. 2011);
thus, investment from China is generally welcomed by developing countries. However, there is the need
to establish value-adding linkages between incoming and local businesses for the expected FDI benefits to
be realized. Kubny and Voss (2014) find that in Vietnam, Chinese firms source local inputs only to a
limited degree, and that their arms-length exchanges do not furnish the expected technology transfers.
Similar to Vietnam, local sourcing in Africa is particularly low because Chinese businesses typically
import their inputs for production and construction, and so have weak if any linkages with local firms
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(Corkin 2007; Amendolagine et al. 2013). Furthermore, Chinese construction businesses have been
known to import low-skilled Chinese labor for several projects in Africa (Cheru and Obi 2011), which
further obstructs linkages for local knowledge transfer. Sun and Lin (2017) refute the notion of poor
linkages by pointing to a Chinese multinational partnering with the Kenyan Ministry of Education for
skills training. However, their paper also refers to this MNE as “unique among Chinese companies in
Africa in the extent to which it has invested in local skills development”. The phenomenon of limited
business linkages has also been observed in several Latin American countries. In that region, increased
Chinese engagement has often led to relocation of high-end manufacturing activity from some Latin
American countries to China. This relocation means that actual Chinese investment in those countries has
mainly targeted specialization in primary products, which further limits the creation of local value-adding
linkages (Jenkins 2010). Similarly, Flynn (2013) refers to how China's demand for primary products like
minerals and timber restricts specialization in many African countries to low value-added outputs – which
constrains linkages. By nurturing backward and forward linkages, Chinese investors could possibly
generate opportunities for local businesses to be drawn into the global production system, and thereby
deliver on the often-touted “win-win” exchanges (Irshad 2015; Ferdinand 2016). Contrary to such
disposition, infrastructure investments overseas are often viewed as opportunities to increase the demand
for components supplied by businesses back in China (Swaine 2015; Chia and Sussangkarn 2006).
Therefore, it is considered reasonable that incoming Chinese firms would source production inputs not
from local suppliers, but mainly from their parent companies or other Chinese firms (Corkin and Burke
2006; van der Lugt et al. 2011). In fact, backward linkages in the host country may only serve to
strengthen the foreign business position where there is the need to establish initial local connections or
build legitimacy in an incremental expansion model (Johanson and Vahlne 2009), as may be the case in
Sun and Lin (2017). Moreover, such linkages may be loose, and not aimed at developing the long-term
relationships that enhance the productive capacities of local businesses. The weak linkages between
Chinese investors and local suppliers does not appear to be driven by poor absorptive capacity in the local
firms per se, but from the general unwillingness of the investor to recognize, engage or develop local
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capabilities (Kubny and Voss 2014). Foreign-local partnerships that involve shared ownership of portions
of the supply chain, may create better linkages. As Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) finds with Lithuanian
firms, positive productivity spillovers derive more from projects with shared foreign-local ownership.
Another aspect of the potential for reaping positive FDI benefits is the type of goods involved in
the exchange. Chinese businesses may tackle overcapacity by exporting capital goods (Rolland 2015),
and this may be in the interest of importing nations - small scale manufacturers gain increased access to
machinery which support the conversion of inputs into intermediate goods, for example. The opportunity
for technology transfer and improved production capability is improved when FDI is associated with the
import of capital goods rather than consumer goods (UNCTAD 2012). On the whole, the value of capital
goods imports into Africa from China has exceeded the value of consumer goods between 2011 and 2015
(WITS 2016). However, concerns about import competition still remain. Kaplinsky and Messner (2007)
capture this tension in terms of complementary and competitive impacts: for example, where the import
of cheap consumer goods from China could improve the buying power of local customers but also
displace local producers. Elu and Price (2010) note that increased trade with China has the effect of
lowering Total Factor Productivity for sub-Saharan African manufacturing firms directly through import
competition, and indirectly through negative technology transfer. Reduced productivity in African
countries hampers cost reduction efforts and further compounds the relative cost disadvantage (Adisu et
al. 2010). Thus, even where benefits accrue from the exchange, the positive impact may be transient if
African businesses do not build the productive capacity to be relevant in long term exchanges. In a related
context, Chia and Sussangkarn (2006) highlight the need for members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) to pursue integration in order to exploit scale economies and together become
more competitive in their exchanges with China. The essential theme here is that competitiveness elevates
the status of ASEAN countries in the relationship, by increasing mutual dependence with China.
Similarly, rather than expect Chinese businesses to voluntarily create value-adding interactions with
African businesses, Onjala (2010) challenges African countries to actively diversify the structure of their
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exports and produce higher volumes through taking advantage of the scale and scope of the Chinese
economy.

3. Navigating mutual dependence and power imbalance
The idea of African businesses making adjustments to increase their standing in BRI exchanges
may be conceptualized with the resource dependency theory (RDT) – that organizations must restructure
their dependency on the external environment in order to increase their chances of survival (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). Kaplinsky and Morris (2008) present an example of supply chain adjustment adopted by
a South African producer of underwear that faced severe competitive challenges from Chinese imports.
The company helped its retailers reduce inventory holdings and improve their responsiveness to customer
demand – a clear example of relational performance (Carter et al. 2017, Cheung et al. 2011) in the supply
chain. This company had the capability to restructure its dependency on the external environment; and
such traits make it an attractive target for partnerships. Partnering (including alliances and joint ventures,
co-optation, interlocks, mergers, or vertical integration) is one way to create a long-term view of
cooperative business exchanges and reduce uncertainties across the supply chain (Hillman et al. 2009).
The opportunity for value-creating long-term partnerships will increase when the competitive levers
across specific industries in Africa are identified and nurtured.
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) view mutual dependence and power imbalance as two related
aspects of the RDT notion of interdependence between two parties in an exchange. Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) had focused on minimizing interdependence. However, there is value to collaboration and
reciprocity especially between buyers and sellers (Ado and Su 2016). High levels of mutual dependence
shift exchange relationships more toward symbiosis than competition. Thus, the competitive impacts of
power imbalance may be reduced if mutual dependence is high. In the case of African countries, even
though the balance of power is heavily in China’s favor, the exercise of that power may be restrained if
high levels of mutual dependence exist between Africa and China. Clearly, bilateral relations between
African countries and China will yield more benefits if African businesses can supply substantial
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resources that are critical to the BRI. Such resources must be identified carefully, since in several
industries (such as textiles) China has comparative advantage in the factors of production. The production
challenges like capacity limitations in various industries, make production sharing an attractive model for
competitively scaling the output of national or regional supply chains. Koopman et al. (2010) view supply
chains as systems of value-added sources and destinations within integrated production networks. The
integration of production networks is at the core of production sharing, and implies a reorganization of the
production function. Reorganization might involve achieving a balance between outsourcing peripheral
productive functions across a regional network, and controlling the centers of value creation (Neilson et
al. 2014). The functions in the network need to be assigned collaboratively rather than just dictating the
terms of engagement to supply chain partners. This collaborative approach to production sharing may be a
useful framework to consider within industry sectors (Wang et al. 2013). In other words, with proactive
collaboration in a specific industry, it may be possible to establish unique regional or country production
advantages, relative to Chinese businesses, and thus create a basis for increased mutual dependence.
Carter et al. (2017) describe the mutual dependence between Amazon and several businesses in terms of
the benefits to smaller companies of being roped into Amazon’s extensive delivery network, while
Amazon reaps the benefits of better network utilization. This is a win-win in the supply chain. It is from
this perspective, that the study explores the response of African businesses to increased Chinese
engagement.
Industry-level coordination of production sharing does not preclude institutional oversight. On the
contrary, the role of the state may be reframed as an agent of development, as China itself did. Even with
a liberalized economy, China’s policies were endogenously-driven rather than being imposed externally,
allowing them to have better control over the globalization of their economy (Jilberto and Hogenboom
2012). Similarly, the dispensation of zero-tariffs for Cambodian textile exports into the EU, allowed
Cambodia to participate in the textile industry even though neighboring Vietnam had a larger economy, a
larger pool of cheaper labor, and industrial production advantages relative to Cambodia (Chen et al.
2011). Thus, Cheru and Obi’s (2011) challenge to African leadership is pertinent: define thoughtful
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frameworks for bilateral, fair, and balanced cooperation. Could country-level negotiations in Africa create
a fairer production climate and provide incentive for industries to collaborate in a production-sharing
framework that makes the most of the BRI dispensation? Would intra-regional trade in a productionsharing framework redirect China’s engagement with the continent, and result in local enterprise skills
development and technology transfer? These questions align with the main objective of examining
industry-level response strategies under the threat of foreign competition. The next section comprises indepth analyses of industrial flows in Kenya to examine the mutual dependencies and power imbalance
associated with the China-Kenya exchange, and to conceptualize how specific industry sectors might
respond to the competitive pressures accompanying Chinese business engagement.

4. The case of Kenya
In recognition of the significant country differences at the industry and institutional levels across
Africa we focus on the East African region as an area with historic and current connections with China.
We select Kenya for study, given its economic influence within the East African Community of nations
(EAC), the importance of its Mombasa port as a gateway for trade, and evidence of multi-sectoral
Chinese investment. For example, in 2014 Kenya signed a US$3.8 billion agreement for Chinese highspeed railway technology to connect Nairobi to Mombasa, the largest port in East Africa (Arase 2015).
Kenya has the largest economy in the EAC, and is among the top 5 African countries receiving imports
from China. Kenya is also one of two African countries whose Presidents were part of the May 2017 Belt
and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in Beijing; the forum involved cooperative
consultation on the BRI for participating countries (China Daily 2017).
Kenya produces and exports substantial quantities of Tea, Flowers, and Coffee, among others.
Participation in global production networks has often been construed to mean increasing industrial
production for exports, suggesting it may be attractive to target China’s markets with value-added
products. This view is reasonable, given that China’s growth strategy has pivoted to greater reliance on
domestic consumption (Hawke 2016). However, existing capacity constraints limit the scaling of export-
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oriented production in Kenya. For example, Ikiara and Ndirangu (2003) point to a concentration of
Kenya’s industrial production in Export Processing Zones as evidence of infrastructure inadequacies in
the wider economy. Despite such limitations, export orientation will continue to be attractive because
increased scale may translate into productivity, learning, and quality advantages. On the other hand,
export pricing may decrease the incentive for local production if the perceived local value is small,
thereby weakening rather than supporting local industry amid foreign competition. Thus, response
initiatives like increasing the production of premium tea for local Kenyan consumption (Stevis 2017) may
help to not only stabilize producer prices, but also cement the comparative advantage that Kenya has in
Tea production. Similarly, local factories can be reorganized to reduce order minimums, and increase
direct access for small-scale manufacturers. Such reorganization will reduce the direct cost of inputs for
small-scale manufacturers (Coughlin and Ikiara 1988), and increase demand for the output of these
factories, thereby providing impetus for scaling up production, improving learning, and increasing
competitiveness. Reorganization as a response will likewise benefit tanneries and the local leather
industry in general amid growing demand for high quality leather, and the increased import of Chinese
shoes into the EAC. Analogous applications may be made for Sisal, Pyrethrum, and even Tire
manufacturing; the recent capacity additions for automotive assembly in Kenya offers an opportunity for
local tire manufacturers, but without significant reorganization, tire imports from China will limit this
potential.
Our goal in this analysis is not to conduct a comprehensive quantification of China’s impact on
Kenya, but to understand the nature of the impact on industry as a basis to explore potential models for
reorganization. In this regard, a survey of individual businesses is beyond the scope of this study.
However, sans such a survey, evidence exists (as is true even in the US) of local industries that have been
impacted adversely by China’s low-priced imports - including textiles in Zambia, shoes in Ethiopia, and
garden furniture in Ghana (McGreal 2007). Our interest is in exploring options for African businesses in
general, and Kenyan businesses in particular, to remain relevant in global production and trade networks.
Thus, we examine how existing opportunities for reorganization and production sharing might be framed
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in support of a competitive industrial response. We examine product and trade flows within and across
Kenya’s borders, by assembling and triangulating limited available data from several sources including
the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), the East African Community Data portal, the
International Trade Center (ITC) in Geneva, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) of the World Bank, the Hong Kong Trade
Development Council (HKTDC) and other specialized sources like the East African Tea Trade
Association. We also reference available data from the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) to
glean more detailed industry information for a fuller conceptualization of our response framework.
Considering trade flows within East African countries, and between these countries and
destinations outside the region, it is clear that trade within EAC is almost the same in value as that
between EAC and the rest of Africa (see Figure 1). However, trade outside Africa is significantly higher,
and it appears that total trade is more sensitive to the extra-African component. Herein lies the
opportunity for diversifying the direction and structure of African exports and for achieving less volatility
in demand, pricing, and production (Onjala 2010). Kenya’s contribution to EAC trade is significant, even
though in recent years, Kenya appears to have contributed a smaller proportion to trade within the EAC
(see Figure 2). The decline in Kenya’s contribution may not necessarily be as a result of decreased
production per se, but perhaps of the strengthening of productive capacity in other EAC countries, or of
the increase in imports arriving in the other EAC countries. Net FDI flows as a percentage of GDP have
been generally higher in Uganda and Tanzania averaging 4.65% and 4.12% respectively between 2005
and 2015 compared with Kenya at 2.15% over the same period (World Bank 2016).
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Further insights emerge when Kenya’s industrial production is superimposed on imports from
China and total imports (see Figure 3). Evidently, Kenya’s production has been growing, even though at a
slower rate in recent years. World Bank (2016) data corroborate this pattern, but indicate that the valueadded contribution of services has been growing significantly faster than that of manufacturing. The
World Bank data also show that the contribution of manufacturing to GDP was about 11% on average
from 2001-2014 (max 12.8% in 2007, and min 9.7% in 2001 and 2003). However, a regression line from
2006 (5 years after the Doha Round of WTO negotiations) shows a strong negative association between
Year-since-2001 and manufacturing contribution (slope estimate -0.3405, t ratio -9.48). This is a cause for

11

concern since total imports outstripped industrial production in 2011 (see Figure 3). The import of
Chinese tires, for example, may already be hampering local production in that sector. The free flow of
goods and services within the EAC also creates a situation where tires imported from China into Tanzania
may have direct impacts on the productive capacity of the larger automotive industry in Kenya. Overall,
with growing Chinese imports, it remains to be seen to what extent Kenya’s aggregate industrial activity
may be affected. As shown by the components of imports (see Figure 4), the largest proportion of imports
into Kenya comprises consumer goods, and these are not known to support local production capacity as
discussed previously. However, capital goods imports are also high along with intermediate goods,
suggesting that there is a sustained demand for inputs of industrial production. These flows may be
accounting for the fact that we do not currently observe drastic shifts in Kenya’s aggregate industrial
activity. On the other hand, FDI inflows rose from $21m in 2005 to $1.44b in 2015 (UNCTAD 2016),
and may be reflecting China’s involvement in large infrastructure projects (road and building
construction), in the financial sector, and in the telecommunications sector. Investments in these sectors
may also compete directly or indirectly with industrial production (e.g. building materials) in Kenya, if no
prior arrangements exist for sourcing supplies locally. Skillful negotiation and targeted incentives on the
part of government may be a channel by which such large investments may enable industrial production.
The affected sectors may complement such negotiation by reorganizing to leverage the associated
efficiencies in transportation and financial services.
Figure 5: Industrial production in Kenya;
contribution
by sector
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We also identify sector making major contributors to Kenya’s industrial production (see Figure
5). Understanding the nature of these contributing sectors may provide some insights into what
competencies Kenya might leverage to sustain an advantage in certain industries. The graph shows only
the top 7 sectors plus grain mill products. Grain mill products is the highest in the food category, but its
contribution has declined over time. This decline may be a function of droughts in Kenya, and the
inability to effectively source grain supplies from the sub-region. The contribution of coke and refined
petroleum products has been high but variable and may be reflecting petroleum price variation. However,
the increased installed capacity of geothermal power plants may also be reducing the demand for
petroleum products. The contribution of beverages has been growing only slightly over time. Perhaps, this
stagnation reflects the intense price competition in that industry between East African Breweries Ltd, and
South African Breweries. These beverage establishments have now negotiated an operating model based
on co-opetition, and the contribution of beverages may increase with time. The contribution of micro- and
small enterprises is high and significant, and presents an important opportunity for Kenya. When Africa is
viewed as an aggregate market, it is very attractive to foreign investors. The same is true of understanding
the total productive power of micro- and small enterprises in Kenya. We underline the importance of the
aggregate of smaller enterprises by noting that the changing structure of tea production is a credible signal
that small holders cannot be ignored in the Kenyan economy (see Figure 6). The other industry
contributors like fabricated metal, rubber and plastic products, and chemicals and chemical products are
also very significant when taken together (about 14 percent of production). It is reasonable to consider
their joint contribution, given their impact on the automotive industry, for example.
Table 1: Industry sectors represented by the Kenya Association of Manufacturers
Sector
Food & Beverages
Metal & Allied
Chemical & Allied
Plastics & Rubber
Paper & Board
Textiles & Apparel
Motor Vehicle Assemblers & Accessories
Energy, Electrical & Electronics
Building, Mining & Construction
Timber, Wood & Furniture
Pharmaceutical & Medical Equipment
Fresh Produce
Leather & Footwear

N
% of Total
146
24.13
73
12.07
60
9.92
58
9.59
56
9.26
46
7.60
40
6.62
33
5.45
31
5.12
24
3.97
19
3.14
12
1.98
6
0.99

* 102 companies listed in services and consultancy were excluded
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We review the broad structure of industry sectors in the KAM. It is of interest to examine each
industry in turn. For brevity, however, we focus only on the Motor Vehicle Assemblers & Accessories
(MVAA). As expected, there are more companies operating in the associated sectors of metals, chemicals,
plastics and paper than in the MVAA sector. Of the 40 MVAA companies, 21 had websites listed, and 20
of those websites were functional. Based on detailed analysis of information from their websites, we
observe that the companies included: businesses that had started small and kept growing to the third
generation; businesses that operated as subsidiaries of global companies; and businesses that were
operating in the EAC market with plans to further expand into the larger COMESA region. There were
businesses that reported adapting their operating model after WTO rules opened the Kenyan market to
direct global competition. There were also businesses maintaining a hybrid of importing some
standardized intermediate goods, and yet manufacturing their own customized versions of the endproduct. These companies appeared to thematically cater to the harsh transportation specifications of
Kenya, and viewed that strategic targeting as an advantage. The product range was impressive from
vehicle seats and interiors, to filters (air, oil, fuel), to trailers, to complete vehicle design and
manufacturing.
The MVAA industry sector uses inputs from several other sectors including Paper & Board,
Plastics & Rubber, Chemicals & Allied, and Metals & Allied – and if the linkages can be clearly
identified, a system of value-addition will emerge. Considering the scope of production across these
sectors, there is certainly room to leverage the scale and synergies of production sharing. Similar to the
supply chain levers of distinctive local products, local connections, and local distribution networks that
were in Bajaj Auto’s favor (Dawar and Frost 1999), these Kenyan business networks have sometimes
idiosyncratic local advantages. Thus, Kenyan businesses must be proactive about building resilient
industry clusters to maintain a growth trajectory, given the substantial and growing impact of Chinese
engagement. Using the case of Mauritius, Ancharaz (2009) emphasizes building resilience as a way of
mitigating adverse effects of sudden pressure like Chinese dominance, and then striving to create a winwin exchange. In this case, win-win meant China had access to other world markets through Mauritius’
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free trade zones; and Mauritius built its manufacturing base by purposeful negotiation and institutional
support. Mauritius had responded to the AGOA initiative and tariff preferences in the EU by setting up
Export Processing Zones (EPZ), which spurred industrial growth and provided this leverage for engaging
China. In this way, Mauritius was better incorporated into global production networks. An opportunity
exists to approach Chinese engagement as a potential path for participating in global value chains through
technological upgrades and innovation. In the case of Kenya, China is deriving benefits from large-scale
infrastructure projects, and Kenya can coordinate its industrial activity to create a more inclusive supplierbase for Chinese-led projects. Such coordination is best managed by an agency reflecting private-public
partnership. For example, “Enterprise Mauritius” was a collaborative partnership between industry and
government to help local enterprises develop competitive capacity and evolve into regional or global
exporters. Such an agency in Kenya will share a vision of staged but connected production across industry
sectors. This step will help operationalize the vision of production sharing and process innovation within
industry sectors such as the MVAA. Thus, the needed adjustments may be supported institutionally by
removing structural constraints to synergistic production across sectors. As noted earlier, incentives to
reduce order minimums and improve access to inputs from local factories will reduce raw material costs,
increase the pace of local production, and provide better opportunities for scaling. If the fragmented
production in these sectors is better coordinated, the resulting efficiencies will immediately free up
capacity for increased output. Increased output means more learning, with the associated benefits of
quality improvements, innovation and market appeal. All these benefits will help to increase the level of
mutual dependence between Kenya and China, as Chinese businesses seek investments in Kenya.

5. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter explored how African countries might respond to the competitive pressures
associated with China’s increased engagement with Africa in the BRI dispensation. The possibility that
China’s business activity can marginalize industrial production in Africa was of concern because
industrial production has been a critical path of growth for many countries. Thus, despite the imbalance of
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economic power in China’s favor, we examined the plausibility of creating win-win exchanges with
African countries. Specifically, the chapter focused on industry-level adjustments by which African
countries may increase the strategic value of their contribution in BRI exchanges. Despite having access
to limited data on the subject, there was sufficient indication from literature about how economic
exchanges might play out between China and Africa. We found that, based on the pattern of Chinese
business activity in other regions, African countries cannot rely on China to create the industry linkages
that facilitate technology and knowledge transfer unless it is in their clear interest to do so. However,
African countries cannot afford to be ambivalent about the growing dominance of China in their markets.
Rather, these countries could proactively change the power dynamics by increasing the level of mutual
dependence between their industries and China’s incoming businesses. African countries can promote
mutual dependence through reorganizing industry supply chains based on country and regional priorities,
and creating integrated production networks as a means to increase the value their industries bring to the
economic exchange. FDI can and should be harnessed for growth in SSA countries, but it needs to be
done strategically to minimize the downsides and derive reasonable rents. By adopting a response view,
this study contributes a critical dimension to the ongoing debate about how China’s BRI might deliver
tangible benefits to African countries.
The response of industry will be limited without institutional support. Therefore, we offer the
forgoing perspectives on supply chain coordination and production sharing, not only for the consideration
of existing businesses but in hopes that it will help frame the institutional support provided for business
growth in key sectors. By establishing soundly-negotiated investment partnerships with China, African
countries may be able to stimulate local industrialization without having China pursue its usual business
practices in Africa. The returns to a nation, for developing an integrated production network, and building
regional markets to increase demand, may outweigh the mere establishment of Chinese businesses in the
country. Much like a capable stage in a supply chain that manages flows of product, information and
funds, a respected public-private partnership will be responsible for building trust among industry players,
coordinating their roles in the network, and facilitating an equitable distribution of supply chain surplus
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until a steady state of production is attained. At this point, the success of the first iteration will have some
spillover effects, and feed subsequent refinements. This chapter points to some avenues for research on
strengthening the developmental impacts of Chinese investments through responsible supply chain
management and corporate engagement. Our hope is that conversations will continue around the
relationship between globalization, country response, and sustainable economic development. This is
important for strengthening the social contract in various African countries.
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